Testimony of Ali Soufan

Greg Sargent outlines the highlights.

Soufan will say that on several occasions his approach elicited high-value information, some involving the role of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in masterminding 9/11. By contrast, when the CIA interrogators arrived and began employing harsh techniques, such as nudity and sleep-deprivation, no information was forthcoming, he’ll testify.

“The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking,” Soufan will say, adding that when he resumed interrogating him with softer techniques, he again started volunteering high-value information, though the previous use of torture made him “harder to reengage.”

This is key, because Soufan isn’t merely undercutting the claim that torture works. He’s saying it was counterproductive.

Soufan will directly contradict key claims by torture apologists that the techniques elicited high-value information. He will say flat out that the claim that Abu Zubaydah didn’t start giving up info until August 2002, when he was waterboarded, is false. “The truth is that we got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of interrogating him,” Soufan will say.

Soufan will also contradict claims that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to cough up info leading to the capture of so-called “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla. He will point out that waterboarding wasn’t approved until August of 2002, while Padilla was captured in May of 2002.

And Soufan will deny yet another key claim of torture apologists: That torture revealed Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s involvement in 9/11. “That was discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced until almost three months later.” Soufan will say.